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Orphan Embryos 
Rev. John R. Connery, S.J. 
Father Connery, a faithful contributor to Linacre Quarter! 
member of its editorial advisory board, received the Gera . 
Award at the National Federation of Catholic Physicians' Guila 
meeting in Philadelphia in October, 1984. The award is p . 
periodically to an outstanding theologian. 
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The recent news report from Australia about the plight 0 1 frozen 
human embryos virtually orphaned by the death of thei r known 
(mother) parent raises several moral questions. One quest10n has 
already surfaced about the morality of freezing human embryos. 
Others are being raised about the rights of frozen embryos. l: is nat· 
ural that such questions should arise, and they call for responsP, but it 
is critical that the more basic questions be raised as well. We shall try to 
give somewhat brief responses to these queries. 
The most basic question concerns the morality of the whole proce· 
dure of in vitro fertilization, and other forms of artificial reproduc· 
tion. The Church, for serious reasons, is opposed to the substitution of 
technology for the conjugal act in human procreation. The opposition 
is obviously not to technology as such; it arises only when th e Church 
judges that technology violates the plan of God's creation. The under· 
lying reason she opposes this use of technology is that it separates human 
procreation from the expression of conjugal or marital love in sexual 
intimacy and makes it a laboratory process. It is precisely this love 
relationship that makes human procreation different from animal pro· 
creation or reproduction . 
Someone might ask why the Church considers this relationship so 
critical. The basic reason is that; for human beings, procreation of 
itself is not enough. Human offspring need the continued care of adult 
humans to develop and grow as human beings. Without it, human 
development is i.rppossible . To provide for this, God has designed the 
human procreative act in such a way that the child is the product of a 
loving act of the parents. There is consequently a bond between the 
parent and the child which springs from the fact that the child is the 
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expression of the love of the parents for each other. Love of the child 
is included in the love of the parents for each other. To the extent 
th_at the child becomes the product of a scientific procedure, the bond 
With conjugal love and intimacy is lost. 
But is it not possible for two married people to love a child who is 
, _not bonded to them by reason of its origin in an act of conjugal love? 
This certainly can and does. happen. We know that parents can and 
often do adopt a child who is not their own_in any sense and become 
loving parents, able and willing to care for that child. Indeed, we have 
•. Christian obligation to love all human beings. This obligation ob-
VIously does not approach the degree of commitment parents must 
make to children. But people who may initially have been strangers 
often end up making a total commitment to each other in marriage. 
So a love commitment to another human being does not necessarily 
depend on a prior bond resulting from conjugal intimacy. Would not 
th~ same kind of a commitment to a child be possible, especially for a 
child who is at least genetically their own? 
There are certain differences here to which attention should be 
called. First, in adoption and other relations initiated with other 
~uman beings, a certain selection is possible. In peer relations also one 
• free in regard to the degree of commitment he or she wishes to 
lbake. There is not the same selection or freedom in dealing with 
offspring. The relationship is set from the beginning, and ordinarily 
one cannot put a limit to it. Even if the child is handicapped, parents 
Ire not free to reject it. So the kind of bonding that comes from the 
!'lationship of procreation to the love of the spouses is extremely 
llnportant. It is quite true that some people adopt handicapped chil-
dren, and some marry handicapped partners, but it is a matter of free 
eboice, and only a limited number would make such a choice. So the 
lack of freedom in the parent-child commitment makes a difference. 
The bonding is basic . 
In artificial reproduction, there is even a more important difference . 
. The child, at least to some extent, is the product of a laboratory 
PfOcedure. Since the child belongs genetically to the married couple, it 
lrould seem clear that ·they are still responsible for him/her. On the 
~her hand, since the scientific intervention carries with it significant 
lllvolvement by third parties (without this intervention there would be 
llo child), it would be easier for the parents to evade responsibility for 
; child who turned out to be handicapped, or otherwise undesirable. 
echnological intervention of this kind would easily introduce an 
element of ambiguity in regard to responsibility which would be detri-
lllental to the welfare and security of the child . 
. This problem would be present even in artificial reproduction with-
It marriage, that is, an instance where the germ cells came from a 
~ied couple. In fact, it was already present in artificial insemina-
tion, and this was what Pius XII was talking about back in 1948 when 
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he condemned artificial reproduction. But in the minds and an 
of those promoting technological reproduction , these proced1 
only the first steps in this direction . Ultimately, the goal is to ~ 
procreation totally , not only from conjugal intimacy but al;. 
any dependence on the mother. In other words, the goal is to 1 
the child outside the human body. And if the goals of eugeni, 
eering are added, the ultimate aim is to produce the best 
combinations possible. This would complete the separation of J· 
tion from marriage itself. Procreation would be almost totally 
tific procedure, dependent on humans only for the germ cell 
selves. Eventually , not only procreation but even the educatim 
child would be transferred from the home to the scientific lab< 
The bond between procreation and marriage would be to t<• 
rupted . 
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Some might ask why it is not possible to qraw the line at -n vitro 
fertilization within marriage in the sense described above. Th ' scien· 
tific intervention here is minimal and it is of great benefit to ·ouples 
who cannot have children themselves. The question is : C m one 
reasonably draw t he line at this point? If one allows this kind of 
intervention, it is difficult to see how he or she can refuse further 
interventions. The reason would be the same or just as impelling: a 
couple cannot have children otherwise, or they run the risk o1 having 
defective children. If the desire for a child would justify the initial 
separation, it would seem to justify further separation. The next step 
would undoubtedly be to provide 'for a couple, one of whom was 
sterile. This might still be presented as "within marriage" in a broad 
sense of the term, that is, in the sense that the petitioners are husband 
and wife. And it may appear acceptable on this score. It is easy to 
perceive moral differences when one is judging extremes. But when 
one is inching along, the discernment becomes much more subtle and 
deception is easier. Those who find the initial separation of procrea· 
tion from conjugal intimacy acceptable are open to this kind of decep· 
tion. Perception of the truth may come too late. 
But even if one were to insist that in vitro fertilization, is justifiable , 
at least in certain cases (e .g., within marriage, especially wher-e the 
semen was obtained from conjugal intimacy) the technique in ques· 
tion in the Australian case would .still be objectionable. It would be 
objectionable, first of all, because it involved a third party , a donor, 
and therefore a basic separation of procreation from m arriage. It 
would also be objectionable for a second reason; the intention of 
bringing human embryos into being solely for " backup" purposes. 
This mind-set vitiates the whole procedure. 
This latter issue was highlighted in the Australian case by the death 
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of the known parent (mother) of the embryos. But it did not originate 
with this death. Even if the mother had lived and a successful second 
or third implantation was achieved, the procedure would still be 
morally problematic . It was vitiated right from the beginning by the 
fact that the additional embryos were, by explicit intention, " backup" 
embryos. In other words, they would be used only if the first implant· 
ation failed . If it was successft1l, they would be disposed of, or become 
the victims of "benign" neglect. 
What this really means is that the survivai of these embryos was 
deliberately made contingent on the failure of the first implantation. 
The embryos were deliberately brought into being with the intention 
of disposing of them if the first implantation succeed ed. There is no 
way in which this can be justified. Conceivably the technicians 
involved might have intended to use them in a subsequent pregnancy 
(if the first implantation was successful) , but there is little reason to 
believe that they entertained this possibility seriously . In other words 
these embryos were allowed only a conditioned right to life. 
The moral problem related to " backup" embryos could be solved 
simply by implanting all the fertilized ova initially, but this carries 
With it the risk of multiple pregnancies . Multiple pregnancies do not in 
themselves constitute a moral problem, but they may not be desirable. 
Even this procedure, however, fails to resolve the initial moral issue 
raised by reducing procreation to a technological procedure. 
Morality Question Raised 
The question about the morality of freezing embryos must also be 
laised. In fact , I am not sure that a categorical response can be given 
to this question. Ultimately, it depends on whether such a procedure 
Would be for the good of the embryo. I do not think one can rule out 
the possibility that some day it might be . But at present, those 
involved in the Australian case themselves seem to have some· doubt 
that the embryos can survive defrosting. I' L' seems clear that , at the 
titne it was done, the whole process of freezing embryos was (and 
Probably still is) in the experimental stages. The morality of the pro-
cedure consequently has to be judged according to the principles laid 
down for experimenting with human beings . I do not know enough 
about the procedure to judge whether these principles were followed , 
but I must confess to serious doubts about this . I say this because there 
can be no justification for subjecting human embryos t o strict experi· · 
mentation (not for the benefit of the embryo , but for the . benefit of 
leientific progress) , especially where danger to the embryo is involved . 
The physicians current ly involved in the Australian case openly admit 
the danger to survival of attempting to defrost the embryos. 
In an emergency situation where hypothermy, even at t he experi· 
lllental stage, would offer the only hope, even if minimal , of pre· 
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serving an already existing embryo long enough to implant it, it W l uld 
be permissible, but one could never justify causing such an emerg( 1cy 
by deliberately bringing a human embryo into the world for del< ed 
implantation. So I do not see how even therapeutic experimenta ion 
(for the benefit of the embryo) could be justified in the present on-
text. 
The question about the right of frozen embryos to implanta on, 
that is, to survival, is an important one, but the fact that this righ has 
already been compromised should not be forgotten. Even if a :ost 
mother can be found, the initial procedure must still be condem ted. 
Those responsible for the predicament of the embryos (husband, . ·ife, 
physicians, etc.), have an obligation to do what they can to save t! em, 
and hence to find a host mother, if this is feasible . In no way can hey 
simply dispose of the embryos as long as there is reason to be.ieve 
they are still alive. 
But I do not think one could impose an obligation on any01 .e to 
host such a child. If some married couple wanted a child, hostir,g an 
orphaned embryo might be an admirable way of fulfilling their wishes. ' 
It might also be a great act of charity to host such an embryo. Bm one 
can hardly speak in terms of any obligation to do so. The "right,;" or 
justice approach is indeed a valid one, but it is also very difficult to 
apply in situations like the present one. It may be easy enough to 
argue from the rights of one individual to what others in justice ought 
not to do. But one must be very careful about what inferences are 
drawn from the existence of rights as to what others ought to rio in 
justice. This kind of act, relieving a person in need, is prompted by 
Christian charity rather than justice. But, as already mentioned, it 
would be a matter of generosity rather than of obligation. 
Are You Moving? 
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a differ-
ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage 
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and 
more costly. Your cooperation in ~eeping us up-to-date with 
your address will be most helpful. 
-
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Testimony for the Subcommittee 
on Investigations and Oversights 
August 9, 1984 
Rev. Donald McCarthy, Ph.D. 
Rev. Donald G. McCarthy is a priest of the Catholic Archdiocese of 
Cincinnati. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of 
Louvain, Belgium, and in 1972-73 he did a residency in theology and 
medical ethics at the Institute of Religion in the Texas Medical Center 
in Houston. 
Since 1973 he has served as a resource person and lecturer for 
conferences in' the field of medical ethics. He was elected to the boa~d 
of the Pope John Medical-Moral Research and Education Center zn 
December, 1977. He moved to St. Louis in August, 1979 to accept the 
position of director of education at the Pope John Center. In Aug_ust, 
1984 he returned to Cincinnati to become pastor of St. Antonmus 
Pari~h, but he continues to serve the Pope John Center as senior 
educational consultant. 
He is a member of the American Society of Christian Ethics, the 
Catholic Theological Society o{America, and the Institute for Theo-
logical Encounter with Science and Technology . He was a professor at 
Mount St. Mary Seminary in Cincinnati from 1960-79 and director of 
. the Newman Center at the University of Cincinnati from 1960-69. 
My name is Donald McCarthy and I am a Catholic priest of the 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati. For the past five years, I have served as 
director of education of the Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Resear~h 
Bnd. Education Center in St. Louis, Missouri. Our Center stud1es 
elllerging medical-moral issues from the perspective_ of the Judea-
Christian tradition and Catholic teaching. Because I d1d my doctorate 
in philosphy with a doctoral thesis on the philosophical eth~cs of 
Bertrand Russell, one of this century's greatest secular humanists, I 
have some understarlding also of medical ethics from a secular human-
ist perspective. 
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